Ronald Dworkin的第三种理论
c.Ronald Dworkin的第三种理论
c. Ronald Dworkins Third Theory
Ronald Dworkin基于某些法律标准的权威性无法通过社会事实加以解释的理由而拒绝了实证主义者的事实命题主张。例如，在疑难案件中法官求诸道德原则，Dworkin坚信这些道德原则的法律权威性是无法从社会的承认规则中的合法性标准里面推导出来的 (Dworkin 1977, p. 40)。尽管如此，因为法官受相关的原则的拘束，他们必须被定性为“法律”。因而，Dworkin归纳道，“如果我们把原则当作法律的话，我们必须拒绝实证主义者的第一个信条，即一个共同体的法律可以依靠某种根本尺度的测试而与其他社会标准分离”(Dworkin 1977, p. 44)。
Ronald Dworkin rejects positivisms Social Fact Thesis on the ground that there are some legal standards the authority of which cannot be explained in terms of social facts. In deciding hard cases, for example, judges often invoke moral principles that Dworkin believes do not derive their legal authority from the social criteria of legality contained in a rule of recognition (Dworkin 1977, p. 40). Nevertheless, since judges are bound to consider such principles when relevant, they must be characterized as law. Thus, Dworkin concludes, "if we treat principles as law we must reject the positivists first tenet, that the law of a community is distinguished from other social standards by some test in the form of a master rule" (Dworkin 1977, p. 44).
Dworkin认为判决是并且应当是解释性的：“法官通过解释共同体的政治结构来对疑难案件做出判决时，应当依照下面这种，或许不无特殊的，方式进行：基于这一解构的整体性，从最深刻的宪法规则与私法——比如侵权法或合同法的的细则中，尝试着寻找政治道德的原则之间的最佳证立”(Dworkin 1982, p. 165)。此处存在两个解释成功的基本要素。其一，只有当一个解释证立了该社会中的某种实践，这一解释才是成功的。这一解释必须在这种意义上符合这一社会的某种实践——它与现有的定义法律实践的材料相融贯。其二，由于某一解释为那些实践提供了一种道德上的证立，它必须达到可能达到的最好的道德观点。因此，Dworkin称法官应该努力地以大致这样地方式解释法律：
Dworkin believes adjudication is and should be interpretive: "judges should decide hard cases by interpreting the political structure of their community in the following, perhaps special way: by trying to find the best justification they can find, in principles of political morality, for the structure as a whole, from the most profound constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the private law of tort or contract" (Dworkin 1982, p. 165). There are, then, two elements of a successful interpretation. First, since an interpretation is successful insofar as it justifies the particular practices of a particular society, the interpretation must fit with those practices in the sense that it coheres with existing legal materials defining the practices. Second, since an interpretation provides a moral justification for those practices, it must present them in the best possible moral light. Thus, Dworkin argues, a judge should strive to interpret a case in roughly the following way:
有思想的法官可能会为他自己设定——例如——一种任何对资料的解释都需要达到的大致的“限度”，设定这样的限度可以令该当解释在符合社会实践这个面相上是“可接受”的。继而，假设对法律中某一部分内容的多个解释全部符合这个限度，那么在这多种假设之间进行的取舍，并非基于法官在这个面相上对这些解释进行更为深入的探究和更加精确的比较，而是选择一种在“实质上”更好的解释——也就是更好地促进法官所认为正确的政治理想。(Dworkin 1982, p. 171)
A thoughtful judge might establish for himself, for example, a rough "threshold" of fit which any interpretation of data must meet in order to be "acceptable" on the dimension of fit, and then suppose that if more than one interpretation of some part of the law meets this threshold, the choice among these should be made, not through further and more precise comparisons between the two along that dimension, but by choosing the interpretation which is "substantively" better, that is, which better promotes the political ideals he thinks correct (Dworkin 1982, p. 171).
由此，在Dworkin眼中，拘束性原则的法律权威性来自于它们的贡献，这些贡献就是为被看成是一个整体的法律实践提供了最佳的道德证立。当且仅当满足以下两个条件时，特定法律原则就为这种道德证立作出最大的贡献：(1)这一原则与现存的法律材料相融贯；(2)这一原则要在满足原则(1)的条件下取得最大化道德上吸引力。正确的法律原则就是那些可以达到最佳道德的。
Accordingly, on Dworkins view, the legal authority of a binding principle derives from the contribution it makes to the best moral justification for a societys legal practices considered as a whole. Thus, a legal principle maximally contributes to such a justification if and only if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the principle coheres with existing legal materials; and (2) the principle is the most morally attractive standard that satisfies (1). The correct legal principle is the one that makes the law the moral best it can be.
在之后的作品中，Dworkin拓展了他“建构主义”的视野，不仅仅探讨法律裁判，还囊括了法律理论的全部领域。Dworkin将交谈解释从艺术/创造性的解释中分离出来，并且主张解释社会实践的任务更像是艺术性解释:
In later writings, Dworkin expands the scope of his "constructivist" view beyond adjudication to encompass the realm of legal theory. Dworkin distinguishes conversational interpretation from artistic/creative interpretation and argues that the task of interpreting a social practice is more like artistic interpretation:
我们解释Ö时最熟悉的场景就是交谈。我们会解释Ö的这个发音或者记号，并且以此推测他人通过Ö表达了什么。但是艺术解释则是另一码事情：文艺批评家解释诗歌、戏剧与图画，为的是捍卫他们关于这些作品涵义、主题和观点的解读。而我们研究社会实践的解释活动也是以类似于艺术解释的这种形式进行的：这两种解释的旨趣都在于解释人们创造的某些独立于他们自身的实体，而非解释他们在交谈中表达了什么(Dworkin 1986, p. 50)。
The most familiar occasion of interpretation Ö is conversation. We interpret the sounds or marks another person makes in order to decide what he has saidÖ. Artistic interpretation is yet another: critics interpret poems and plays and paintings in order to defend some view of their meaning or theme or point. The form of interpretation we are studying-the interpretation of a social practice-is like artistic interpretation in this way: both aim to interpret something created by people as an entity distinct from them, rather than what people say, as in conversational interpretation" (Dworkin 1986, p. 50).
一如司法上的解释，艺术解释也受制于解释的适切程度和论点证立的程度：“建构性解释是一项这样的活动，它把目的加之于一个对象或实践之上，为的是让这个对象和实践成为它将要归属的那个形式和类别中的可能的范例”(Dworkin 1986, p. 52)。
Artistic interpretation, like judicial interpretation, is constrained by the dimensions of fit and justification: "constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong" (Dworkin 1986, p. 52).
在Dworkin看来，法的一般理论的目的就是解释一系列相当复杂的社会实践，这些社会实践是“人们创造的某些独立于他们自身的实体”；正是基于这个理由，Dworkin坚信建立一种法的一般理论的课题，乃是内在地建构性的：
On Dworkins view, the point of any general theory of law is to interpret a very complex set of related social practices that are "created by people as an entity distinct from them"; for this reason, Dworkin believes the project of putting together a general theory of law is inherently constructivist:
法的一般理论Ö必须是抽象的，因为它的目标是解释法律实践的主要目的及其结构，而不是法律实践的特定部分或某个部门。法的一般理论除了具有抽象性之外，还必须是一种建构性的解释：它们应当最佳地展示作为整体的法律实践，在实际的法律实践和最佳的证立之间寻求平衡。做到这些的话，法理学就与法庭判决和法律实践的其他方面就不存在清晰和生硬的界限了 (Dworkin 1986, p. 90)。
General theories of law Ö must be abstract because they aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice, not some particular part or department of it. But for all their abstraction, they are constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a whole in its best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justification of that practice. So no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any other aspect of legal practice (Dworkin 1986, p. 90).
Dworkin眼中的法理学和判决之间是如此的紧密，以致于法理学沦落为判决理论的主要部分；正是如此，Dworkin才做了以下概括：“任何法官的意见，就其本身来说即是法哲学的一部分”(Dworkin 1986, p. 90)。
Indeed, so tight is the relation between jurisprudence and adjudication, according to Dworkin, that jurisprudence is no more than the most general part of adjudication; thus, Dworkin concludes, "any judges opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy" (Dworkin 1986, p. 90).
由是，Dworkin不但拒绝了实证主义者的事实论，也同时拒绝了实证主义者关于法律理论的基本假设。Hart区分了两种对待法律实践的观点，一种是对法律实践的“内在观点”，持这种观点的人将法律实践作为为行动提供正当指示加以接受，而另一种是外在观点，持这种观点的观察者企图理解法律实践，但是他不把法律实践作为权威的、正当的行为指示。
Accordingly, Dworkin rejects not only positivisms Social Fact Thesis, but also what he takes to be its underlying presuppositions about legal theory. Hart distinguishes two perspectives from which a set of legal practices can be understood. A legal practice can be understood from the "internal" point of view of the person who accepts that practice as providing legitimate guides to conduct, as well as from the "external" point of view of the observer who wishes to understand the practice but does not accept it as being authoritative or legitimate.
Hart了解，他的法律理论是描述性的。同时，就其提供了所有法律体系的共同特征这点上又是一般的，而这恰好就是一种对所有法律体系的外在观点。正是如此，Hart肯认他的这个课题是“一种完全不同于Dworkin的‘法律理论’（或是他常用的‘法理学’概念的事业，因为Dworkin的法律理论在某些方面是评价性、辩护性的，而且是作为‘献给特定的法文化’的——这是理论家自身所处的，对Dworkin来说就是英美法系的——一种理论”(Hart 1994, p. 240)。
Hart understands his theory of law to be both descriptive and general in the sense that it provides an account of fundamental features common to all legal systems-which presupposes a point of view that is external to all legal systems. For this reason, he regards his project as "a radically different enterprise from Dworkins conception of legal theory (or jurisprudence as he often terms it) as in part evaluative and justificatory and as addressed to a particular legal culture, which is usually the theorists own and in Dworkins case is that of Anglo-American law" (Hart 1994, p. 240).
这段评论表明Hart坚信Dworkin的理论对象同实证主义存在根本上的区别，作为分析法学的实证主义，它总是着力于概念分析。就这点来说，Dworkin也是把他的工作看成是概念性的，只不过他与Hart对“概念性”的理解是不同的：
These remarks show Hart believes Dworkins theoretical objectives are fundamentally different from those of positivism, which, as a theory of analytic jurisprudence, is largely concerned with conceptual analysis. For his part, Dworkin conceives his work as conceptual but not in the same sense that Hart regards his work:
我们全部——至少是全部的法律家——共享着法律和法律权利的概念，同时，我们为了这个概念的不同观念相互辩难。实证主义者捍卫着一种观念，而我试图捍卫另一种观念。我们互不认可法律权利是什么，很大程度上，就如同我们这些哲学家，为了正义为何而争吵不休。我倾心于我所熟识的特定法律体系，并不是为了表明实证主义对这个法律体系的解释有多差劲，我只是想说明实证主义提供了很差劲的“法律权利”的观念(Dworkin 1977, 351-52)。
We all-at least all lawyers-share a concept of law and of legal right, and we contest different conceptions of that concept. Positivism defends a particular conception, and I have tried to defend a competing conception. We disagree about what legal rights are in much the same way as we philosophers who argue about justice disagree about what justice is. I concentrate on the details of a particular legal system with which I am especially familiar, not simply to show that positivism provides a poor account of that system, but to show that positivism provides a poor conception of the concept of a legal right (Dworkin 1977, 351-52).
Hart与Dworkin之间的差别引起了很多法哲学家——最晚近的就是Bix (1996)，怀疑他们俩并非真的站在截然不同的立场上。这里还有一个问题存而未决，就是Dworkin的作品可否被归入分析法学这个传统。
These differences between Hart and Dworkin have led many legal philosophers, most recently Bix (1996), to suspect that they are not really taking inconsistent positions at all. Accordingly, there remains an issue as to whether Dworkins work should be construed as falling under the rubric of analytic jurisprudence.
